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Davis and Moore's theory of stratification,1 though frequently discussed, has stimulated remarkably few studies. Perhaps this is due to the lack of derivations of empirical propositions in the original article. I would like in this note to outline some empirical implications of the theory.
Davis and Moore's basic argument is that unequal rewards tend to accrue to positions of great importance to society, provided that the talents needed for such positions are scarce. "Society" (i.e. people strongly identified with the collective fate) insures that these functions are properly performed by rewarding the talented people for undertaking these tasks. This implies that the greater the importance of positions, the less likely they are to be filled by ascriptive recruitment.2
It is quite difficult to rank tasks or roles according to their relative importance. But certain tasks are unquestionably more important at one time than at another, or more important in one group than another. For instance, generals are more important in wartime than in peacetime. Changes in importance, or different importance in different *This note was stimulated by a seminar presentation by Renate Mayntz, who focused attention on the problem of empirical investigation of functional theories.
IKingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," American Sociological Review, 10 (April, 1945), pp. 242-249. 2 The theory holds that the most important positions, if they require unusual talents, will recruit people who otherwise would not take them, by offering high rewards to talent. This result would take place if one assumed a perfectly achievementbased stratification system. Some have asserted that Davis and Moore's argument "assumes" such a perfectly open system, and hence is obviously inadequate to the facts. Since the relevant results will be obtained if a system recruits more talented people to its "important" positions but ascribes all others, and since this postulate is not obviously false as is the free market assumption, we will assume the weaker postulate here. It seems unlikely that Davis and Moore ever assumed the stronger, obviously false, postulate. Consequence 3: In some industries individual talent is clearly a complementary factor of production, in the sense that it makes other factors much more productive; in others, it is more nearly additive. To take an extreme case of complementarity, when Alec Guiness is "mixed" with a stupid plot, routine supporting actors, ordinary production costs, plus perhaps a thousand dollars for extra makeup, the result is a commercially very successful movie; perhaps Guiness increases the value of the movie to twice as much by being three times as good as the alternative actor. But if an equally talented housepainter (three times as good as the alternative) is "mixed" with a crew of 100 average men, the value of the total production goes to approximately 103 per cent. Relatively speaking, then, individual role performance is much more "important" in the first kind of enterprise. Let us list a few types of enterprises in which talent is a complementary rather than additive factor, as compared with others which are more nearly additive, and make the appropriate predictions for the whole group of comparisons: 
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For each of these comparisons we may derive the following predictions:
(a) The distribution of rewards (e.g., income distributions) should be more skewed for organizations and industries on the left, whereas the top salaries or honors should be nearer the mean on the right. In organizations with ranks, there should be either more ranks or greater inequality of rewards within ranks on the left.
(b) Since the main alternative to pure achievement stratification in modern society is not ascription by social origin, but rather ascription by age and time-in-grade, seniority should determine rewards less in the systems on the left than on the right. There are of course many ways to measure it. For instance, men at the top of the income distribution in groups on the left should have reached the top at an earlier age those those on the right. There should also be a higher proportion of people whose relative income has declined as time passes in the talentcomplementary industries and groups.
Other easily accessible empirical consequences of the theory are suggested by the increased importance of the goal of industrialization in many countries since World War II, the rise in the importance of international officials during this century, and the increased importance of treatment goals in mental hospitals. Since these consequences are easy to derive, we may omit their explication here.
Another set of derivations can be made if we add a postulate that a bad fit between functional requirements and the stratification system makes people within the group (and particularly those strongly identified with the group) perceive the system as unfair. For example, this postulate together with the others would imply that where talent is a complementary factor, those organizations with seniority stratification systems should create more sense of injustice than those in which the young shoot to the top. In addition, the alienation should be greatest among those more committed to group goals in seniority dominated talentcomplementary groups, whereas it should be greatest among those less committed to the group where there is an achievement system. All these consequences ought to be reversed, or at least greatly weakened, for groups where talent is an additive factor.
It may be useful to present briefly a research design which would test this consequence of the theory. Suppose we draw a sample of colleges and universities, and classify (or rank) them on the importance of research within them. Perhaps a good index of this would be the number of classroom contact hours divided by the number of people of faculty rank on the payroll, which would be lower, the greater the importance of research relative to teaching.
Within each of the institutions we compute a correlation coefficient between age and income of faculty members. (Since the relation between age and income strikes me in this case as being curvilinear, some transformation of the variables will be appropriate.) The higher the correlation coefficient, the more seniority-dominated the stratification system of the institution.4 The first hypothesis that we can immediately test is that this correlation coefficient should be generally smaller in research-dominated institutions. This is a direct consequence of the functional theory as originally stated.
Then we could divide institutions into four groups, according to whether they are research or teaching institutions and whether they are seniority-dominated or not. We could ask the faculty within a sample of such institutions a series of questions which would sort out those highly devoted to their work and to staying in the system, and those not highly devoted. At the same time we could ask them to agree or disagree with some such statement as "Most faculty promotions in this school go to the people who deserve them most." According to the functional theory with the added postulate on the sense of justice, we could predict results 4An elimination system, in which young people are either fired or given raises, depending on their performance, will also produce a high correlation between age and income within an institution, and yet may produce (if the institutions with such elimination systems have markedly higher salary scales), in the higher educational system as a whole, a lower correlation. I doubt if the appropriate adjustments for this would substantially affect the analysis except for a very few institutions, but this is of course an empirical question. The adjustments could be made, theoretically, by including the people who have been fired, with their current incomes, in the institutions which fired them. 
